The delirium of change: Giles Deleuze's optimistic postmodernism 
Introduction
One o f the major criticisms levelled against postmodern social theory is its seeming pessimism. In contrast to the assumption o f ultimate social progress which underlies much o f the modernist project, postm odernism makes no claims as to the inevitability o f a better life. Yet, within postmodernism there are certain key divisions, one o f the most important being between the ultimately nihilist stance o f thinkers such as Baudrillard, and the more optimistic vision o f others, such as Giles Deleuze. This article focuses on D eleuze's conceptions o f individual and collective action, and social change -an area o f his writings probably o f the m ost direct interest to the sociologist. It should be noted that this area forms but one dimension o f D eleuze's extremely broad writings, and should be seen as distinct, yet related to his other studies. The latter consists o f w orks o f selected philosophers, including not only Kant and N ietzsche, but also SacherKoers 62 (2) 1997:177-188 Masoch, an excursus on "Alice in W onderland" and, more recently, his monumental study o f cinema, both as an art form and a reflection o f social reality (Deleuze, 1989) .
M uch o f his work on oppression and change w as in collaboration with psychoanalyst Felix Guattari. In these collaborative works, a major focus is on the role o f conventional psychology as an instrument o f social control, and alternative approaches to therapy. These issues receive less attention in D eleuze's individual works. However, in common with the individual works, the collaborative writings also cover issues o f w ider social order and control. Deleuze (1983:70) asserts that the odyssey through life is a series o f lines. Firstly there is one's linear progression through a number o f com plem entary specialised social environments, from family, to school, to the work environment, and, finally, to the infirmary. Secondly, there is the more complex m olecular line. This is the line o f social interactions, o f one's follies and fears -a line w hich is ultimately reflected in one's linear progression. The third line tracks downw ard, o f one's destination to the unknown and unexpected. It is through the recognition o f these three aspects o f the individual's temporal journey that personal liberation is possible. Deleuze (1983:72) asserts that this liberation may be brought about either through "schizo-analysis" or "micro-politics" . "Schizo-analysis" is the technique outlined in detail by Deleuze, in collaboration with Felix Guattari in their jo in t w ork, A nti- Oedipus (1983a) . This w ork is grounded in a critique o f conventional approaches to psychotherapy, drawing on G uattari's own experiences as a psychoanalyst. However, as will becom e apparent, A nti-O edipus links issues concerning the individual psyche with wider social injustice, sketching a far broader critique o f social reality. Some o f the latter themes are carried through to D eleuze's subsequent w orks (which w ere written on his own), although the psychologicallyorientated framework outlined in collaboration with Guattari is abandoned (e.g. Cinema 2: The Time Im age [1989] ).
Space and time
In Anti-O edipus, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the status quo channels individuals in a specific direction in such a manner that most desire to follow it, deviance being ultimately equated with madness (Deleuze, 1989:34) . It is impossible in a brief article to fully discuss the plethora o f interlocking arguments and conclusions in this monumental work, much o f which builds on the w orks o f Wilhelm Reich. Acknowledging this debt, Deleuze and Guattari assert that their major departure from that theorist is that Reich still believed in the conception o f rationality "as w hat it ought to be ... and the irrational element in desire, and by regarding only this latter as a suitable object for psychoanalytic examination" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983a:29) .
Basically, Deleuze and Guattari assert that conventional psychoanalysis forms an integral com ponent o f existing structures o f control and domination in society, expressly designed to curb unruly social practices, rather than assist the individual. In contrast, "schizo-analysis" focuses on the social context, and the individual quest for liberation therefrom. Thus, w hat is considered to be mental illness, may be an individual quest for freedom, with it and " schizo-analysis" constituting a libratory form o f "micro-politics" . It can be argued that this approach is inherently limited. W hilst Deleuze and Guattari do supply a useful counterweight to the excesses o f Freudian psychoanalysis, they do little to provide concrete guidelines for assisting those afflicted with mental illness, be it o f social or biological origin, or, for that matter, those around them. Perhaps, in this area, their demolition o f existing social and psychological constructs is too com plete, and too little has been left to replace it. Significantly, whilst sympathetic to many o f Deleuze and G uattari's arguments in this area, even Michel Foucault never took schizo-analysis seriously, or saw it as a realistic alternative to psychotherapy (Miller, 1993:282) .
Although it retains a concern with the individual, a contemporary work to the first volume o f Capitalism an d Schizophrenia, "Politics", written by Deleuze on his own (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1983a:87-l 02) , is far more concerned with the emergent dangers in the quest for individual liberation, rather than prescribing specific strategies. Indeed, Deleuze (1983:93) concedes that the most creative and libratory o f the three life lines, the molecular line, incorporates certain inherent dangers. On the one hand, there is the "black hole phenom enon" -the phenomenon o f stepping over the personal edge into oblivion, as per Kurtz in C onrad's H eart o f D arkness (W akefield, 1990) . On the other hand, there is the possibility o f "micro-fascism", " Stalin's little groups", "neighbourhood dispensers o f justice" -in other words, an extreme devolution o f power, although, according to Deleuze, desirable, may itself result in domination, albeit at a more personal level.
D eleuze and history
A general problem with postm odernist social theory is that postm odernism is at once a methodological tool, a theoretical frame o f reference, and a description o f contemporary society (society has entered a postm odern age). In D eleuze's writings, these three issues are particularly conflated. In contrast to many other postm odern social theorists, D eleuze's perspective is broadly historical, concerned with the rise o f the contemporary state. On the one hand, as the major site o f repression, the state emerged at a very early stage. On the other hand, the technologies o f domination are very much more advanced in contemporary society (Deleuze, 1989) , making the possibility o f social liberation more difficult. Thus, despite the above-mentioned historical approach, Deleuze devotes the bulk Koers 62 (2) 1997:177-188 o f his attention to a description o f contemporary reality. Similarly, the solutions proposed are specifically focused on the postm odern age (see D eleuze, 1983).
T erritorialization and flight
A persistent theme in D eleuze's writings is that o f space and territory. Deleuze assumes that space and territory exist at three levels: at the level o f physical space, in terms o f the freedom-domination nexus, and, following on Foucault, in terms o f the overlapping and, at times, conflicting, pow er netw orks in which the individual is enmeshed. All three levels may operate simultaneously, in a complementary and contradictory fashion. In understanding social life, Deleuze, in collaboration with Guattari (1983b:2) , argues that one should not only consider the current locale o f individuals and groupings within these three levels, but also how they actively resist this status, be it through deterritorialization or flight. The former is about destroying, or rendering pow er networks meaningless, and the latter about changing locale, seeking an alternative social reality, which may or may not be about actual physical movement. The latter, w hich does not presuppose the elimination o f power relations, D eleuze and Guattari (1983b:5) concede is really the only feasible option. This w ould involve a deformalization o f social relationships, with interactions being purpose-orientated, and not regulated or bound by the complexities o f social norms, routines, and underlying power networks (see D eleuze & Guattari, 1988:380) . Essentially, w hat is being proposed is a form o f anarchism, an inversion o f D urkheim 's concept o f a developing collective consciousness underlying the routinization o f socia! interactions (see Durkheim, 1933) . Such an inversion presupposes that the systematization o f social life is inherently repressive, and cannot be considered as social progress. Deleuze and G uattari's anarchism differs from the European anarchist tradition in that it accords no special role to any majority grouping in society such as the working class, and instead prom otes the particular, the different and the mutant (cf. Sorel, 1925) . Deleuze and Guattari (1983b:5) argue that in addition to the operation and speed o f flight, such radical actions also concern machinic relationships (inter alia, between the individual and social groupings), and the rather chilling concept o f "bodies without organs", B.W .O. The latter concept, again, encom passes two, rather distinct, yet related meanings, both o f which are closely related to earlier concepts introduced by Foucault. Firstly, there is the meaning in terms o f bio power, o f the individual's body within pow er networks. Non-com pliance results in physical action being placed on the individual, either in term s o f physical violence, or, more commonly in modem societies, the individual being coercively removed from the public eye, and placed under constant surveillance, as part o f the dominating interests' normalising technologies (Foucault, 1979) . This notion echoes the medieval concept o f "The M an o f Sorrows", o f C hrist's physical body bearing the strains o f the world.
Secondly, there is an even darker meaning. Shortly prior to his death, in interviews, Foucault gave detailed accounts o f the benefits o f extreme sadomaschochistic sexual practices. Inter alia, the benefits would include the desensualization o f the sexual organs and the eroticization o f the entire body. This concept may seem to echo M arcuse's call for the eroticization o f social life, going beyond the conventional sexual act (see Kettler, 1978:17) . However, Foucault's meaning is somewhat more complex than M arcuse's. The latter held that this would entail the freeing o f creative influences, and that o f ushering in a new era o f social harmony and creativity. To Foucault, the spreading o f sensuality is also about pow er and domination, which will exist in all social contexts, and the pleasurable face thereof. D eleuze and Guattari (1983a) echo Foucault's thinking in their detailed, loving descriptions o f sado-maschochistic torture, involving the sewing up o f bodily orifices as a path to liberation. However, their conceptions are somewhat more abstract and symbolic than Foucault's views on the matter. Deleuze and Guattari (1983a:282) assert that it represents the epitome o f production, o f "antiproduction", o f opposition to the existing operations or workings o f society. As a critique o f Freudian theories, they assert that the schizophrenic's frequent claim o f an inner emptiness reflects an escape from an oppressive social reality (D eleuze & Guattari, 1983a:8) , the ultimate deterritorialization and flight from the physical body itself. Sado-maschochistic torture would represent only one o f a number o f possible lines o f flight, others o f which could include forms o f political action. The latter possibility is most explicitly developed in D eleuze's " solo w orks", when, as noted above, the strong focus on alternatives to psycho-therapy that is a feature o f his collaborative works with Felix Guattari, is diluted. Thus, reflecting his close links with M aoist politics in the 1960s (see Miller, 1993:195) , Deleuze (1983:87) asserts that some o f the most creative lines o f flight and action are in fleeing repressive adversaries, citing M ao's Long M arch as one such example. The Long M arch w as not only a flight from KM T domination, but also a proving ground, and a process whereby a new political system w as developed. H ow ever, Deleuze concedes that such potentially liberating actions can easily result in "reterritorialization", in new forms o f repression and domination replacing the old.
Interestingly, in a later joint work with Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:470) he asserts that micro-tribal movements, those localised nationalist movements seeking autonomy incorporate certain potentially beneficial components. They cut themselves off from the "majority", that oppressively hom ogeneous grouping in any society which denies individual autonomy, and, indeed, forms the basis o f Koers 62 (2) 1997:177-188 authority and domination. Recognizing such movements as a fundamental challenge to its existence, the state will seek to avoid the granting o f com plete local autonomy, seeking instead greater binding through a series o f deals offering supposed "local government" or "devolution o f pow er" .
In 1988 Deleuze and Guattari (1988:470) argued that w hen all society fragments itself into groupings o f minority, greater freedom is possible, "minority as a universal figure, or becoming-everybody/everything" . Once minorities break free from the "plane o f capital", from seeing themselves in terms o f other groupings in society, it is possible to completely escape existing pow er netw orks (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:472) . Since then, petty nationalist movements not only within Europe, but also in many areas o f the developing world have proliferated. These movements do indeed constitute attem pts to break aw ay from domination by w hat is perceived to be an alien majority. In many cases, they represent the response to the bankruptcy o f grand ideologies and the loss o f meaning associated with globalization. H ow ever, few o f these movements have themselves dem onstrated greater tolerance, nor for that m atter the rights o f other minorities. In m ost cases, ethnic identity is defined not ju st in terms o f a specific meaning, but also in terms o f difference, in perceived superiority to others. The fragmentation o f multi ethnic states has often gone hand-in-hand with ethnic cleansing. It is evident that the libratory micro-tribalism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari easily m utates to new systems o f domination, often little different in operation to the previous order.
P ow er and the state
The individual's odyssey through life implies ongoing contact with pow er relations, which, indeed, are a form o f "over-coding m echanism " (Deleuze, 1983:78) . Complex pow er relations and networks are in operation in society, the most important concentration being the state (Deleuze, 1983:78) .
The state's capacity for domination is most refined in the advanced societies, where ritualization ultimately permits the operation o f a highly developed over-coding machinery. In other w ords, mechanisms o f domination cannot ultimately control the individual's life path. However, they will seek to channel it, to shape and form it.
Should the line w aver from the approved path, the overcoding mechanisms come into play, seeking to redirect it into an approved path (Deleuze, 1983:80) . Deleuze and Guattari (1988:430) assert that there is no inherent reason why societies should tend to the more com plex, or w hether groups o f small villages or towns are less advanced than states. Rather, the process o f state formation is that o f binding or capture, in the form o f precedents, laws, and the em ergence o f property. "Free action ... is com pared, linked, and subordinated to a com mon and homogeneous quality called labour" (Deleuze & G uattari, 1988:442) . It em ploys violence to contradict those who set themselves in opposition to its order, either in challenging its monopoly o f violence or engaging in other forms o f conduct which w ere legal prior to the state's seizure o f dominance over society.
Although capitalism presupposes certain market mechanisms w hich operate independently o f the state, such mechanisms are subject to "axioms", being " stopping points ... reordering ... which prevents decoded flows ... from escaping in all directions" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:461) . In other words, the centrifugal tendencies in capitalism, reflected in repeated crises, are contained through state intervention, an example being R oosevelt's N ew Deal following the 1929 Wall Street crash. In general, axioms represent low key adjustments, often responses to struggles at the localised level. In the extreme case, axioms mutate to form a " fictitious proliferation, a multiplication by subtraction" -fascism (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:461) .
It should be noted that whilst the state's primary function is a regulating one, operating through routinized mechanisms, it coexists with the mechanism o f physical coercion, "the w ar machine" (Deleuze, 1983:102) . Although it might seem that the latter is simply an integral part o f the former, the latter's role is largely destructive, and coexists uneasily with the state mechanisms dedicated tow ards the routinized preservation o f painstakingly constructed structures o f regulation and control.
In their second m ajor joint work (in fact, sub-titled the second volume Anti-O edipus), Deleuze and Guattari (1988:424) assert that the w ar machine indeed is exterior to political sovereignty. They assert that political sovereignty itself encom passes tw o poles, the "magical" leader who institutes sovereignty by means o f force o f personality, followed by those w ho regulate and institutionalise it. O nce established, the state seeks to expropriate the w ar machine, to bring it under its sw ay (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:425) , gaining a monopoly on violence. In contrast to conventional theories o f the state, D eleuze and Guattari believe that this does not necessarily make society any more humane, but rather increasingly sophisticated, yet brutal mechanisms will be em ployed to secure authority. In the end, the means o f violence is either the property o f the state, and a prerequisite for its existence, or an independent centre o f pow er opposed to it. They believe that the capture o f the means o f violence by a centralised state made changes in production possible and not vice versa (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:430) . This does not mean that the w ar machine cannot regain autonomy, as indeed has happened in many societies in the developing world. However, this regaining does not mean a return to some primitive ideal or some "zig-zag evolution" to an inevitable conclusion. Rather, it is a temporal and spatial movement, reflecting changes in the topography o f power.
Koers 62 (2) 1997:177-188 
R hizom es, concealm en t and action
Another persistent metaphor employed by Deleuze in his collaborative w ork with Guattari is that o f root systems. Employing the pagan Norse image o f a tree ( Yggdraisal) as the centre o f the world, they see the dominant root system as reflecting prevailing social reality. M odem society has multiple (radicet) roots, reflecting the multiple social influences being brought to bear on the central project. Beyond modernity is the alternative system o f rhizom es, the centre o f a plethora o f conflicting " semiotic chains" (D eleuze & G uattari, 1983b: 11) . Ideally, rhizomes should be free to expand in all possible directions. Invariably, however, social options are limited, with "deviants" being channelled back into acceptable paths (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1983b:41) . Violence is em ployed against those who are seen as violent -"criminals" , primitives, and nom adsthose who challenge the existing order, the existing peace (D eleuze & Guattari, 1988:448) . Returning to the spatial metaphor, it is argued that a rhizom e is a "node o f plateaus", o f space for free action, without beginning or end, the freedom o f the nomad, that has to be understood through radically different mechanisms o f analysis (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:53; cf. Dunn, 1991:131) . This action is neither constrained nor anchored through a central taproot.
G ood and evil
D eleuze's writings do not provide a clear indication o f w hat is most desirable or progressive, and, indeed, are profoundly amoral. Indeed, it is argued that choices between, and definitions o f good and evil, are simply tem porary choices, which can readily be reversed. Even the will to pow er, as envisaged by N ietzsche, is no longer a cleansing force. Deleuze argues that in the postm odern age, in both the individual and in society, in philosophy and reality, the will to pow er had turned inward, had become essential suicidal (M iller, 1993:197) . H ow ever, Deleuze believes that it is indeed possible to stop short o f becoming a "will to nothing" . It is possible to stop short o f "madness and suicide", harnessing the creative side o f the will to power, distilling its vital essence, "a monstrous and lawless becom ing" (Miller, 1993:198) .
M etaphors and reality
Deleuze employs a complex range o f metaphors in his w orks, that both brilliantly illustrates and confuses his premises and arguments. Although these m etaphors are wide ranging, they are most frequently in terms o f pagan N orse belief systems, Bronze and Stone Age W estern Europe, and, m ost commonly, the nomads o f Central and Eastern Asia. In fact, Deleuze travelled rarely outside the confines o f Paris, did little empirical study o f nomadic society on a structured basis, his descriptions being often more fanciful than factual. N onetheless, these parables do provide key insights into the dynamics o f social life, particularly o f the nexus between regulation, order and domination, and freedom, action and autonomy. Said (1990: 2) asserts that rather than providing an abridgement and description o f a particular set o f social practices, D eleuze's writings represent "a concotation o f brilliant work, w e are unlikely to see again for a generation", a combination o f a mystical aestheticism, and an analysis o f the limits and possibilities o f libratory politics. Deleuze (1983:87) is critical o f conventional revolutionary politics, asserting that pow er and desire are closely related, the desire for change often being a desire for power. This is a major reason why D eleuze's recipes for political action are somewhat opaque, and quite clearly designed for a small grouping o f insiders, those who have mastered the complex forces operating on those seeking to break loose from domination. However, he does outline a revolutionary programme, orientated around localised, particularised activism.
T ech n iqu es for change
D eleuze asserts that it is possible to cast aside the state's mechanisms o f domination, along with the stultifying notions o f guilt, pity, logic, and reason (Miller, 1993:197) . However, the appropriation o f mechanisms o f domination by the state does not mean that its overcoding mechanisms will always function efficiently, that "decoded flows" will cease to occur. In other w ords, individuals or micro-collectives can, and will continue to seek to escape the homogenizing pow er o f the state.
Indeed, the existence o f such mechanisms presupposes the existence o f such flows or tendencies, although w herever possible, the state will seek to prevent them from combining or complementing each other. Essentially, one is dealing with a series o f contradictions, which can be summarised as follows:
• Although seeking to overcode individuals in a uniform fashion, the state's existence presupposes the existence o f decoded flows.
• The state aims to stop the unification or consolidation o f these flows which are also the raison de 'être o f its existence.
• Should these flows combine, new mechanisms o f domination and overcoding will emerge therein. Jn other words, the most feasible mechanisms or organizations advancing resistance politics are in fact the least desirable. D eleuze's conception o f libratory politics is rather close to that o f Michel Foucault. Essentially, Foucault argued that conventional protest movements often simply result in new forms o f domination. Instead the most feasible strategy is to, by one means or another, draw attention to the plight o f a particular grouping, whereafter they should be left "to speak for themselves" (Poster, 1984:147) .
Foucault put these ideas into practice with his rather ineffectual penal reform grouping, GIP (Prisons Information Group).
Baudrillard has argued that in a desire to escape the legacy o f Stalinism, Foucault sought solutions in anarchism, in terrorism, " and other forms o f useless protest" (quoted in Deleuze, 1988:xxix; see W akefield, 1990:134) . Rejecting Baudrillard's assertion, Deleuze asserts that Foucault not only provided a comprehensive critique o f the status quo, but also o f Leninist vanguardism. Deleuze him self w as involved in GIP in the early-to mid-1970s, at this time being one o f Foucault's closest confidants (M iller, 1993:190) . By introducing the notion o f "outsider" into his works, as adverse to class, D eleuze argues that Foucault provided an automatic critique o f Marx.
H owever, Foucault believed that it w as still possible to create a com prehensive organization that might play a central role in bringing about real change, a notion rejected by Deleuze (1988:xxx) . This difference coincided with a personal dispute between Foucault and Deleuze (over Foucault's passionate support for the state o f Israel) that resulted in the two thinkers breaking o ff all contact until shortly before Foucault's death (Miller, 1983:282) . In contrast to Foucault's views on the possibilities o f organization, Deleuze and Guattari (1983a:374) assert that when "powerful organizations" emerge to represents w orkers, "they get nasty as soon as the nature o f their aims is questioned" . Unlike Foucault, D eleuze w as never a member o f the French Com munist Party, and his w orks contain far fewer echoes o f the M arxist tradition. For example, there are certain parallels between the concept o f "modes o f production" and Foucault's "modes o f information" (cf. Poster, 1984) . In contrast, D eleuze's conception o f history is that o f overlapping and interwoven lines, linking time, space, domination and power, with no clear beginning and end (see Deleuze, 1989:98-105) . However, in common with W eber, D eleuze (both individually, and jointly with Guattari) concedes the existence o f certain key dates and turning points in history, most notably the em ergence o f the state and the w ar machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:430; see W eber, 1950) . In addition, "there are all kinds o f external circumstances that mark profound breaks" such as the rise and fall o f great empires (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:459) . H ow ever, the latter does not concern the abolition o f the state, simply an alteration o f its form.
T he lim its o f liberation
As noted earlier, Deleuze recognizes the limitations o f personal liberation. Although the schizophrenic is one who flees or seeks to alter an unbearable social existence, they by no means are liberated, are real revolutionaries, or possess any special insights. Indeed, the schizophrenic is one o f those who have stepped over the edge, an " object o f fear and horror" (Deleuze, 1983:98) . W hile advocating extremist revolutionary politics, Deleuze (1983:98) expresses horror o f "the madman, the addict, and the delinquent", conceding that some o f the extremist solutions advocated " scare m e" . M any in D eleuze's immediate circle did, indeed, fall victim to drugs, madness, or tli-j "micro-fascism" o f random terrorism (Miller, 1993:198) . Those who seek to marginalize themselves, will, in the end, proceed to oblivium "with only occasional micro-fascist utterings ... w e are the avant garde, w e are the marginalized" (Miller, 1993:98) . In his desire to confine his solutions, Deleuze him self steers close to such an end. However, as Miller (1993:194) notes, in contrast to Foucault, Deleuze expressed little interest in doing, rather than simply thinking about "the unthinkable", those areas o f conduct barred by society, but, potentially, the most libratory.
C onclusion
Deleuze has sketched out a comprehensive critique o f contemporary social relations, suggesting a programme for revolutionary change that is radically different to the pessimism espoused by most postm odernist thinkers and the modernist radical tradition. In his collaborative w orks with Felix Guattari, both alternatives to conventional psychotherapy and the broader question o f social liberation are explored. In his individual works, less attention is accorded to the role o f conventional psychology as an instrument o f social control, and much more free-ranging techniques o f liberation are outlined. In common with Michel Foucault, Deleuze asserts that the individual is locked in an inherently repressive, yet faceless network o f pow er relations, and faces constant overt or tacit coercion to remain on a set life path. As an alternative, Deleuze offers the w ay o f the human deserter. He concedes that breaking away from the status quo may either entail delinquency and madness, or the erection o f alternative and equally repressive forms o f social organization. However, it is possible to bring about the deroutinization o f social life, a recognition o f individual and minority particularities, reducing society to a series o f transactions concerned with fulfilling localised short term needs. It can be argued that D eleuze's at times fevered vision offers a totally new path to freedom and self-actualization in contrast to the over-worn solutions o f much o f modem radical thought. However, there is little doubt that D eleuze's alternative neither takes fully into account the potential negativities o f particularism (especially apparent in the early 1990s following the collapse o f Soviet rule in Eastern Europe) nor does it offer a clear blueprint or programme for liberation. DELEUZE, G. 1983 
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